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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 930097-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

SEAN P. McFADDEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a denial of defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea and the resulting conviction for
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1991), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Is actual knowledge of the collateral consequence of
possible deportation a prerequisite for the entry of a knowing
and voluntary guilty plea?
Was defendant, a resident alien with Canadian
citizenship, denied effective assistance of counsel solely
because his attorney did not inform him that by pleading guilty
defendant might be subject to the collateral consequence of
deportation?
Both of the issues presented on appeal arise in the

context of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty.

Such orders are typically reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard.

See, e.g., State v. Truiillo-

Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992) .
In this case, the trial court expressly ruled that, as
a matter of law, defendant was not entitled to relief because
potential deportation is a collateral consequence that does not
implicate the voluntariness of a guilty plea.

(See R. 262 where

court adopts holdings to that effect from other jurisdictions.)
In its brief, the State asks this Court to hold that, as a matter
of law, an accused need not be informed of the potential
collateral consequence of deportation in order for a guilty plea
to be knowing and voluntary.

Similarly, the State urges this

Court to rule that, as a matter of law, a defense counsel's
failure to advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation
cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Such rules of law are purely legal conclusions that are
reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded the trial
court.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

Accordingly, if this Court determines that the trial court
adopted the correct rule of law, then it cannot be said the trial
court abused its discretion.
In the event this Court declines the State's request to
adopt its proposed rules of law (or declines to reach the issue),
then it must review the trial court's additional ruling on the
2

merits of defendant's claim.

In so doing, the trial court's

factual findings on such issues as witness credibility should be
reviewed for clear error.

Id. at 935-36.

Only if this Court

then concludes that the facts as found by the trial court are
sufficient to establish that trial counsel was ineffective can it
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Amendment VI, United States Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-405 (1990) (R. 6). After the State had presented
all, or virtually all, of its evidence against defendant at a
jury trial, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the
lesser included offense of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1990), (R. 7783, 213). After an extensive plea colloquy, the trial court
accepted defendant's plea and discharged the jury (R. 120-145).
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to
3

withdraw his guilty plea in which he claimed he had no
alternative but to enter a plea to the lesser offense because his
trial counsel's representation was so inadequate that any hope of
being acquitted had been dashed.

Defendant also requested that

he be appointed independent counsel to represent him in his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 89-90, 102 at 1-12) .

The

trial court denied both motions and sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Penitentiary and ordered that he pay restitution, the amount of
which was to be determined by the Board of Pardons (R. 87-88, 102
at 33) .
Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his
motion for appointment of independent counsel.

This Court

reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
appoint replacement counsel and remanded the case to the trial
court with directions that defendant be appointed independent
counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw his plea R.
112) .
Proceeding with new counsel, defendant renewed his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

In his renewed motion,

defendant alleged for the first time that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to inform defendant that by
pleading guilty he might be subject to deportation.

After an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court again denied defendant's
motion (R. 147-97).

Defendant appealed, but this Court dismissed

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because no final appealable
4

order had been entered (R. 204).
After obtaining his third and present counsel,
defendant asked that an appealable order be entered by the trial
court.

The' trial court entered adverse findings of fact and

conclusions of law, and denied defendant's motion in a signed
order (R. 210). Defendant then appealed that order.

Prior to

briefing, however, defendant sought and received an order of
remand under Utah R. App. P. 23B so that additional evidence
could be heard on the issue of whether his trial counsel was
ineffective (R. 229). At the completion of that hearing, the
trial court entered findings of fact as required under rule 23B.
Apparently satisfied that all ineffectiveness issues had been
fully litigated before the trial court, defendant proceeded on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The material facts of this case are undisputed.
Defendant is a resident alien with Canadian citizenship
(R. 149). Although a Canadian citizen, defendant entered the
United States in 1961 at the age of two after being adopted by
his parents -- both of whom were citizens of the United States.
He has lived in this country since 1961 and is the father of
children who are United States citizens (R. 156-57).
Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-405
(1990) (R. 6) . After the State had presented nearly all of its
evidence against defendant at a jury trial, defendant entered a
5

negotiated plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of
forcible sexual abuse (R. 77-83, , 213, 254) .
Defendant's trial counsel knew defendant "had a prior
sexual offense related conviction" and that he "was from Canada"
(R. 250). However, the record does not indicate that counsel had
any reason to know that defendant was a resident alien as opposed
to a naturalized citizen.

Counsel did not inform defendant that

by pleading guilty he might be rendered deportable (R. 250-51).
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea,
defendant testified that he knew he could petition for United
States citizenship based on his relationship to his parents and
children, but said he had never filed such a petition because he
"never felt the need to" (R. 158). He raised the issue of his
immigration status when he learned he would be subject to
deportation after his conviction in this case is "final" (15759) .
As of the date of the hearing below, defendant had not
petitioned for citizenship (R. 158). Rather, defendant contended
below, as he does on appeal, that had he known that a guilty plea
might make him subject to deportation he would have insisted on
going to trial.
In addition to making extensive findings from the bench
(R. 191-96), the trial court entered detailed written findings of
fact (R. 210-15).

When defendant moved for reconsideration of

the court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, the court
entered a "summary decision and order" of denial (R. 262-64).
6

(Copies of all of the trial court's findings and orders are
attached hereto as Addendum A.)

The trial court "adopt [ed] the

holding of those case which do not require defense counsel to
inform a defendant of the potential deportation consequences
flowing from a guilty plea" (R. 262). In addition, the trial
court

found that defendant's testimony was not credible.

It

found that defendant, having seen the State's evidence, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense solely to avoid being convicted of a
more serious charge and that he would have pleaded guilty even if
he had been informed about the possibility of deportation.
Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, as well as defendant's motion to
reconsider the denial of that motion (R. 191-96, 210-15, 262-64) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Deportation proceedings are civil actions that are
separate and distinct from criminal prosecutions.

As such, the

possibility of deportation is a collateral consequence, not a
direct consequence, of entering a guilty plea.

Because actual

knowledge of collateral consequences is not a prerequisite to the
entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the fact that
defendant was allegedly unaware of that he might be subject to
deportation does not, as a matter of law, render his guilty plea
involuntary.
Similarly, because defense attorneys are under no
constitutionally derived duty to inform defendants of the
collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea, defense
7

counsel's alleged failure to advise defendant of possible
deportation does not constitute deficient performance under the
first prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 105
S.Ct. 2052 (1984), test for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

In any event, defendant has not demonstrated a

reasonable likelihood that he would have insisted upon going to
trial had he been told of the possible deportation consequences
of entering his guilty plea.
otherwise.

Indeed, the court expressly found

Accordingly, this Court uphold the trial court's

denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
affirm his conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM THAT, BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW
THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA MIGHT RENDER HIM
DEPORTABLE, HIS PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because that plea was entered knowingly
and voluntarily.

Defendant argues only that because "he was

unaware he could be deported from the United States for pleading
guilty to forcible sexual abuse . . . his plea could not have
been a knowing and intelligent waiver of a known constitutional
right."

Br. of Defendant at 29. As demonstrated below, possible

deportation is a collateral consequence about which a defendant
need not have actual knowledge in order for a guilty plea to be
deemed knowing and voluntary.

The trial court's denial of
8

defendant's motion to withdraw his plea should therefore be
affirmed.
Defendant has never argued that the trial court's plea
colloquy was inadequate under Utah R. Crim. P. 11. As this Court
noted in State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah App. 1992,
however, a "trial court's compliance with Rule 11 does not
foreclose the possibility the court abused its discretion in
refusing defendant's motion if his plea was in fact involuntary."
The only claim advanced by defendant is that he had to have
actual knowledge of his possible deportation in order to enter a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

As demonstrated below, that

argument lacks legal merit.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that an
accused must be "fully aware of the direct consequences" of a
guilty plea.

Bradv v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970)

(emphasis added).

As Bradv implies, "[c]ertain consequences of a

guilty plea are 'collateral' rather than direct, however, and
need not be explained to the defendant in order to ensure that
the plea is voluntary."

United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35,

38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).

See also United States

v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("We presume that
the Supreme Court tin Bradvl meant what it said when it used the
word 'direct'; by doing so, it excluded

collateral

consequences."); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir.
1989) ("If the consequence flowing from the plea is 'collateral,'
then the defendant need not be informed of it before entering the
9

plea.").
The collateral consequences of a guilty plea "may
include the loss of civil service employment, the right to vote
and to travel freely abroad, the right to a driver's license, and
the right to possess firearms."

United States v. Del Rosario,

902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

Deportation

also is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea because, "it is
well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and
severe for the alien, is not a punishment."
U.S. 32, 39, 44 S.Ct. 283, 286 (1924).

Mahler v. Eby, 264

Rather, "[d]eportation,

however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified
as a civil rather than criminal procedure[.]"

Harisiades v.

Shauahnessv, 392 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 521 (1952).
In recognition of the fact that "potential deportation
is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea[,]" federal courts
addressing the issue have uniformly held that trial judges are
not required to inform a defendant of the possibility of
deportation in order for defendant's plea to be deemed voluntary.
See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177 (3rd Cir.
1988).

See also United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F.Supp. 586,

589 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Russell, 686 F.2d at 39; Fruchtman v.
Kenton, 531' F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976).

United States v.

Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2nd. Cir. 1975); Downs-Morgan v.
United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (all holding that
trial judges are not required to inform an accused of possible
10

deportation).

As discussed below, sound policy reasons support

this position.
Requiring a trial court to inform an accused of
potential deportation as part of a plea colloquy would open
Pandora's box:
The collateral consequences flowing from a
plea of guilty are so manifold that any rule
requiring a district judge to advise a
defendant of such a consequence as
[deportation] would impose an unmanageable
burden on the trial judge and 'only sow the
seeds for later collateral attack.' United
States v. Sherman, 474 F.2d 303, 305 (9th
Cir. 1973) .
Fruchtman, 531 F.2d at 949.

It is unreasonable to expect judges

to "draw up a complete list of possible consequences" and require
the judge to advise an accused of each possible collateral
consequence.
Cir. 1974).

Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 467 (2nd
As the Michel court emphasized:

To require that [a trial judge] anticipate
the multifarious peripheral contingencies
which may affect the defendant's civil
liabilities, his eligibility for a variety of
societal benefits, his civil rights or his
right to remain in this country, all of which
might give rise to later claims that the plea
was not voluntary in the absence of informed
consent, has not been required in our
jurisprudence, constitutionally or otherwise.
Id. at 466.
The need to draw manageable boundaries around what
consequences an accused must comprehend in order for his guilty
plea to be valid also is evidenced by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.

For

instance, one of the objectives of rule 11 "is to insure that a
defendant knows what minimum sentence the judge
11

must impose and

what maximum sentence the judge

may impose."

Notes of the

Advisory Committee on Rule 11, 1974 Amendment (emphasis added).
Deportation, however, "is not the sentence of the court which
accept[s] the plea but of another agency over which the trial
judge has no control and for which he has no responsibility."
Michel, 507 F.2d at 465.

Accordingly, a trial judge need not

inform a defendant of possible deportation because it is not part
of "the punishment that he

is meting out[.]"

Id. at 466

(emphasis in original).
The concerns expressed by the courts in Michel and
Fruchtman are legitimate.

Simply put, no rational distinction

can be made that justifies requiring judges to advise an accused
of some collateral consequences and not other collateral
consequences.

Because requiring actual knowledge of all possible

collateral consequences in order for a guilty plea to be deemed
valid is an

impossible burden to satisfy, the wiser course is to

strictly adhere to the Brady requirement of fully informing an
accused of the direct

consequences of his plea while refusing to

expand the plea colloquy to include discussion of possible
collateral consequences.
Defendant, however, properly notes that Florida
requires trial judges to advise defendants of possible
deportation.

See Defendant's brief at 27 n.20.

As defendant

further notes, Florida's requirement is based on a rule of
criminal procedure.

See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.172(c) (8) (1993).

It

appears that only a few other states have enacted similar rules
12

or statutes.

See, e.g.,

Cal. Penal Code § 1016.5 (1993); Conn.

Gen. Stat. 54-lj (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 278 § 29D (1993);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (1993); Wash. Rev. § 10.40.200 (1993).
However, no court appears to have imposed the requirement urged
by defendant as a matter of constitutional, or even common, law.
Nor should this court.

Rather, the imposition of such a

requirement should come, if at all, from the Utah Supreme Court
via revision of Utah R. Crim. P. 11.
The direct/collateral consequences distinction is
manageable and is in keeping with the Brady requirement that an
accused be informed of the "direct" consequences of his guilty
plea.

Accordingly, this Court should follow the majority and

better reasoned view that, as a matter of law, actual knowledge
of the collateral consequence of possible deportation is not a
prerequisite for the entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty
plea.
POINT II
FAILURE TO ADVISE A DEFENDANT OF THE POSSIBLE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF DEPORTATION DOES
CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel.
In order to demonstrate otherwise, defendant "must show (1) his
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) there
exists a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient
conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable to
defendant."

State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah App. 1992)

(citing State v. Frame, 723 p.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), and State
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v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah App. 1989)).
This two-pronged test is drawn from the United States
Supreme Court case of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 2052,
and was summarized in Frame:
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. . . . Defendant
must prove that specific, identified acts or
omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. The
claim may not be speculative, but must be a
demonstrative reality, sufficient to overcome
the strong presumption that counsel rendered
adequate assistance and exercised "reasonable
professional . . . judgment." And, an
unfavorable result does not compel a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of
counsel....
Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough
to claim that the alleged errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome or could
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact
finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively
show that a "reasonable probability" exists
that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different. We have defined
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient
to undermine the confidence in the
reliability of the verdict.
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (footnote and citations omitted).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985),
the Supreme held that the Strickland test applied with equal
force to "ineffectiveness claims arising out of the plea
process."

474 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. at 370.

In addition to

requiring proof of "unreasonable" performance falling outside
"the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
14

cases [,]" in order to obtain relief in the plea setting, "the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial."

474 U.S. at 56, 59, 105

S.Ct. at 368, 371 (internal quotation marks, citations and
footnote omitted).

Defendant in this case has failed to carry

his burden under either prong of Strickland as defined in Hill.
1.

The Sixth Amendment Does Not Require Defense
Counsel To Advise A Defendant of the
Potential Collateral Consequences of Entering
a Guilty Plea.

As discussed under Point I above, trial judges are
under no duty to advise an accused of the possible collateral
consequence of deportation before accepting a guilty plea.
Similarly, a defense counsel's failure to advise a defendant of
possible deportation cannot constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel:
[A]ctual knowledge of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea is not a
prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and
intelligent plea. Therefore, a defendant's
lack of knowledge of those collateral
consequences cannot affect the voluntariness
of the plea. Accordingly, counsel's failure
to advise defendant of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to
the level of constitutionally ineffective
assistance.
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted).
As the United States Fifth Circuit Court recently
observed,

fl

[t]he [federal] courts that have addressed the

question of counsel's failure to warn of possible deportation
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[arising from a guilty plea] have uniformly held that deportation
is a collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence the
failure to advise [the accused of possible deportation] does not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel."
Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993).

United States v.

Accord Campbell, 778 F.2d at

768; Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1869 (1993); United States v. Del
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied 498 U.S. 942
(1990); United States v. deFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir.
1989); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); U.S. v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 338
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7-8 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir.
1985); Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir.
1977); Nunez-Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d 723, 726 (1st
Cir. 1976); United States v. Santileses, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d
Cir. 1975) .
While deportation may be a harsh collateral
consequence,
a deportation proceeding is a civil
proceeding which may result from a criminal
prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed
in the criminal proceeding. It is collateral
to the criminal prosecution. While the Sixth
Amendment assures an accused of effective
assistance of counsel in criminal
prosecutions, this assurance does not extend
to collateral aspects of the prosecution.
George, 869 F.2d at 337; accord Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d at 944.
Further, "[t]o hold otherwise would place an unreasonable burden
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on defense counsel to ascertain and advise of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea."

Yearwood, 863 F.2d at 8.

In

sum, deportation is only one of many possible collateral
consequences of a guilty plea, and judicial imposition on defense
counsel of an affirmative duty to investigate such consequences
would unfairly burden defense counsel and unnecessarily
jeopardize valid guilty pleas.
Some federal courts have, however, recognized one
exception to the general rule of no ineffectiveness, and that is
in cases where counsel inaccurately represents that the defendant
will not be subject to deportation.

See e.g., Downs-Morgan v.

U.S., 765 F.2d, 1534, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1985); Campbell, 778
F.2d at 768-69; Santelises, 509 F.2d at 704.

In such cases, the

usual remedy is a remand to determine whether the
misrepresentation prejudiced the defendant, particularly when
deportation may entail exceptionally harsh consequences and the
defendant has a colorable claim of innocence.
F.2d at 1541.

Downs-Morgan, 765

That exception is inapplicable in this case

because defendant has not asserted that his counsel affirmatively
misrepresented the possible deportation consequences of his plea.
Nor has defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence.
Most state courts have adopted the federal view that
counsel is not constitutionally required to inform a defendant of
possible deportation.

See, e.g, Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d

28, 31 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Boodhoo. 593 N.Y.S.2d 882,
883 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Ovekova v. State, 558 So.2d 990, 990
17

(Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); Dalev v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322-23
(Md. Ct. App. 1985); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa
1987); State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987); People v. Dor, 505 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986); Tafova v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972), cert,
denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
Defendant relies heavily on opinions from those few
states that have held that the failure to advise a defendant of
potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea may
constitute ineffective assistance.
21 and authority cited therein.

See Defendant's brief at 15-

Defendant's reliance on those

cases is misplaced because most of them have been overruled.

See

People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (111. 1991), disapproving
People v. Padilla. 502 N.E.2d 1182 (111. Ct. App. 1986);
Commonwealth v. Frometa. 555 A.2d 92, 94 (Pa. 1989), overruling
Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1982); State v.
Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 961 (Fla. 1987), overruling Edwards v.
State, 393 So.2d 597 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).
Defendant's reliance on opinions from other states
vacating a defendant's guilty plea is similarly misplaced
because, unlike Utah, those states have rules or statutes
requiring trial courts to advise a defendant of the possibility
of deportation.

That requirement puts the question of

deportation squarely at issue during a plea colloquy.

See, e.g.,

State v. Baeza, 496 N.W,2d 233, 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to state
18

statute after trial court failed to advise of deportation);
Commonwealth v. Mahedeo, 491 N.E.2d 601, 603-04 (Mass. 1986)
(same); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334-36) (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding counsel's failure to investigate deportation
consequences was ineffective assistance); Lyons v. Pearce, 6 94
P.2d 969, 977-78 (Or. 1985) (holding counsel was ineffective due
to failure to request judicial recommendation against
deportation).
Absent a rule or statute requiring notice of
deportation consequences as part of a plea colloquy, it appears
that Colorado is the lone state to impose an affirmative duty on
counsel to investigate and advise defendants about the collateral
consequence of deportation.
1987).

People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo.

Cf.' State v. Dalev, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. App. 1985)

("In the absence of such a statute . . ., this court is
constrained to follow the overwhelming weight of authority in
this country that the trial court's failure to advise Petitioner
of possible deportation proceedings did not affect the
voluntariness of his guilty plea.").
Understandably, defendant relies on Pozo, and at first
blush it appears to support defendant's ineffectiveness claim
insofar as the court held that the "potential deportation
consequences of guilty pleas in criminal proceedings . . . are
material to critical phases of such proceedings."

Id. at 529.

On that basis, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when
counsel is aware that the defendant is an alien, " [counsel] may
19

reasonably be required to investigate relevant immigration law."
Id.
The Colorado court imposed that duty because of the
harshness of deportation and because, at that time, a trial judge
could make a judicial recommendation against deportation within
thirty days of sentencing, which was binding on the U.S. Attorney
General.

Id. at 528-29.

The court reasoned that, because the

trial court could take steps to avoid the defendant's
deportation, that made deportation more "material" than other
collateral consequences, triggering counsel's duty to investigate
immigration law.

That rationale is no longer valid.

Congress,

in passing the 1990 Immigration Act, repealed the former
statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b), allowing for a judicial
recommendation against deportation.

See Act Effective November

29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050.

See

also United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1991),
cert, denied 112 S. Ct. 1487 (1992) (rejecting ex post facto
challenge to repeal of judicial recommendation against
deportation); United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831, 832 (2d Cir.
1992) (same).
Moreover, the Pozo court did not hold that failure to
advise a defendant of possible deportation necessarily
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

Rather, it held

that, even when counsel is aware of defendant's alien status and
fails to conduct research into the question of deportation, that
finding "would not render the attorney's performance inadequate
20

in the absence of a finding that such conduct resulted in
prejudice to [the defendant.]"

Pozo, 746 P.2d at 528-29.1

Irrespective of the wisdom of Pozo, it is of little
assistance to defendant because he has failed to establish that
his trial counsel knew defendant was not a United States citizen.
Rather, the affidavit drafted by defendant's current counsel and
signed by his trial counsel indicates only that his trial counsel
knew defendant was "from Canada" (R. 250). Defendant elected not
call his trial counsel at the hearing on his claim of
ineffectiveness.

Accordingly, the record provides no support for

the conclusion that defendant's trial counsel knew that defendant
was a resident alien or whether he instead was under the
impression that defendant was a naturalized citizen.

Because

defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel knew
about defendant's alien status at the time defendant entered his
guilty plea, Pozo does little to advance defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In sum, virtually every court that has addressed the

1

In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rovira argued that "[t]he
majority opens the door to innumerable challenges to pleas based
on the defendant's ignorance of other serious collateral
consequences." Pozo, 746 P.2d at 532-33 (Rovira, J.,
dissenting). It appears that Justice Rovira's concerns have come
to fruition in Colorado. See People v. Garcia. 815 P.2d 937
(Colo. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992) (en banc)
(Vollack, J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion, holding that
counsel's alleged advice that criminal guilty plea would bar
subsequent civil action required remand to determine prejudice,
was an expansion of Pozo "signalling an open invitation for
defendants to challenge guilty pleas based on any number of
collateral consequences," and imposed "impossible burden" on
defense counsel).
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question of whether a trial counsel's failure to advise a
defendant of possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea
has disposed of that claim under Strickland's performance prong
without addressing the issue of prejudice.

This Court should

likewise adopt the rule that, as a matter of law, a defense
counsel's alleged failure to advise a defendant of possible
deportation" cannot give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness
because the right to counsel "does not extend to collateral
aspects of a prosecution."
2.

George, 869 F.2d at 337.

Defendant has Failed to Establish
That He Was Prejudiced by Counsel's
Alleged Failure to Advise Him that
he Might be Subject to Deportation
Were he to Enter a Plea of Guilty.

Even if this Court were to consider defendant's
ineffectiveness claim under the Strickland prejudice prong and
forgive defendant's failure to establish that his trial counsel
was aware of defendant's resident alien status, it should still
affirm defendant's conviction.

As demonstrated below, defendant

has failed to properly challenge the trial court's determination
that defendant would have pled guilty even if he had been aware
of the possible deportation consequences of such a plea.
In the instant case, the trial court found that
defendant's testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw
his plea was not credible in any respect (R. 191-96).

At the end

of the hearing below, the trial judge made the following comments
about defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty had he
known that it might render him subject him to deportation:
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Now, I have gone through all the reasons
why [defendant], today,. tells me he wants to
withdraw his plea of guilty. Except for this
one about the potential loss of -- alleged
potential loss of his right to be in the
United States upon his release from prison.
And I must consider that in the context
of everything he's told me so far today, all
of which so seriously challenges his
credibility that, frankly, there is not a lot
that Mr. McFadden could say that is not
subject to substantial challenge on the basis
of his credibility.
He tells me that he would not have
entered a plea of guilty had he known th[at]
this could affect his status as a resident
alien. I do not believe that testimony. And
for that reason alone it is sufficient for me
to deny the motion to withdraw on those
grounds.

I might add that there is really no
sufficient basis on the record, factual
basis, to show to me th[at] there is any risk
whatsoever to the defendant that he would
lose his right to continue to reside in
somewhere in the United States.
I mean, we have an unnamed, undefined
agent coming out to the prison; no petitions,
no letters, nothing like that [to
substantiate defendant's claim that he is
going to be deported.]
R. 196.

See Addendum A.
In its subsequently entered findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the trial court emphasized that

!l

[d]uring

examination by the court and cross-examination by the State, the
defendant was evasive, self-serving and [gave answers that were]
inconsistent with earlier statements to the court" (R. 212). The
court concluded that defendant's testimony was "untrustworthy and
incredible" (R. 212). It is also clear that the court was
particularly suspicious of defendant's claim that he would not
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have pled guilty but for the alleged errors of his trial counsel:
The defendant had just listened to all, or
virtually all, of the State's evidence in a
trial which may have resulted in his
conviction of a first degree felony with a
minimum mandatory sentence of 5, 10, or 15
years to life. The defendant entered his
plea after a full and free discussion with
the court about its meaning, his state of
mind, and his understanding. He said he
understood, that his decision was voluntary
and that he wanted to plead guilty, He now
says that he lied to the court, that he
didn't understand, and that he was misled.
There is no reason to suppose his latest
version is anything but a case of acute
buyer's remorse conjured up from prison.
There is no legal reason to allow him to
withdraw his plea of guilty.
R. 212-13.

See Addendum A.

Finally, in its order denying defendant's motion to
reconsider defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the
trial court further explained that "defendant's demeanor and
statements at the time his plea was tendered and accepted
indicated to this court that his sole motive was to avoid what he
perceived was a likely jury verdict of guilt.

As a consequence,

disclosure of a possible deportation would not have changed
defendant's' decision to plead guilty" (R. 263). See Addendum A.
Defendant assails the trial court's analysis and
particularly takes issue with the fact that the court denied his
motion to withdraw his plea because, among other reasons, "the
court was convinced [defendant] was guilty of the charged crime."
Defendant's brief at 29.

As demonstrated below, however, the

trial court's analysis is in keeping with that employed by other
courts addressing the issue of prejudice in similar
24

ineffectiveness claims.
Those few courts that have elected to examine the issue
of prejudice arising from an attorney's failure to advise a
defendant of potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea
have focused their inquiry on the strength of the government's
case to determine whether the defendant's motivation for the
guilty plea was the prospect of leniency in light of strong
evidence of guilt.

See, e.g., United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d

101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989); Huante, 571 N.E.2d at 742-43; In re
Peters, 750 P.2d 643, 646-47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988);

State v.

Chung, 510 A.2d 72, 79-80 (N.J. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Dor,
505 N.Y.S. 317, 320-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); State v. Arvanitis,
522 N.E.2d 1089, 1094-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
A mere assertion by a defendant that, but for counsel's
failure to advise, the defendant would have elected to proceed to
trial is insufficient to establish prejudice.

Id.; Huante, 571

N.E. 2d at 742, Peters, 750 P.2d at 647. Rather, a defendant
must demonstrate that his counsel's failure to advise of the
possible deportation consequences influenced the decision to
plead guilty because, absent such influence, a defendant's plea
cannot be deemed involuntary.

Arvanitis, 522 N.E.2d at 1095. In

short, the defendant must show that "remaining in the United
States was an important part of his plea decision. . . . made in
reasonable reliance upon an ignorance of the fact that he would
be deported."

Id.

In order to evaluate whether deportation would have
25

been an important consideration in a defendant's decision to
plead guilty, courts review the government's case against the
defendant to determine whether the defendant's desire for
leniency outweighed any possibility that the defendant would be
willing to take his chances on acquittal to avoid deportation.
Id.

The stronger the case against the defendant, the more likely

that deportation would not have been a relevant consideration in
entering a guilty plea, because "[defendant] would have pled
guilty anyway or, had he not done so, been found guilty after
trial."

Nino, 878 F.2d at 105.
In this case, the trial judge observed "all, or

virtually all, of the State's evidence" before accepting
defendant's guilty plea and determined that "defendant's demeanor
and statements at the time his plea was tendered and accepted
indicated to this court that his sole motive was to avoid what he
perceived was a likely jury verdict of guilt.

As a consequence,

disclosure of a possible deportation would not have changed
defendant's decision to plead guilty" (R. 212, 263). See
Addendum A.
In order to challenge the trial court's finding,
defendant must demonstrate that the case against him was so weak
that he would have been willing to take his chances with the jury
in hopes of avoiding possible deportation instead of entering a
plea agreement that protected him from a minimum mandatory prison
term.

Defendant has made no effort to make such a showing.

Indeed, he has not even made the trial transcript part of the
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record on appeal. Absent that record material, it is impossible
for this court to review the trial court's rulings.
therefore be presumed to be correct.

They must

Cf. State v. Robbins, 709

P.2d 771 (Utah 1985) (in the absence of a transcript on appeal, a
reviewing court will presume regularity of the proceeding below).
Finally, defendant has not even established that he is
likely to be deported.
"deportable."

Rather, he has only shown that he is

It may well be that innumerable resident aliens

are "deportable" but nevertheless are allowed to remain in the
Untied States. As the trial court emphasized, defendant
presented no credible evidence to show that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service was contemplating deportation (R. 196).
Rather, he testified that some unnamed, unidentified person with
an INS badge told him they would deport him.

As for the

affidavits of defendant's attorney and his attorney's secretary,
the only action that they indicate INS has taken is to create a
file on defendant and that, in any event, no deportation action
is commenced against any convicted alien until that conviction is
final -- "after the alien has exhausted his first appeal of
right" (R. 244-48).

Nothing in the record indicates that

defendant attempted to secure a copy of that file or to have an
INS representative testify at the 23B hearing conducted below.
Such evidence would have shed light on the question of whether
INS is likely to take any action against defendant.

Given that

defendant has resided in the United States since 1961 when he
entered the country at the age of two, is the adopted child of
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two United States citizens, and is the father of children who are
United States citizens, it may well be that INS will not seek his
deportation.

Absent some tangible proof that was "likely" and

not merely possible, the trial court properly rejected
defendant's claim that if his counsel had apprised him of the
possible deportation consequences of his guilty plea he would
have insisted on allowing the case to be submitted to the jury.
Accordingly, even if this Court were to reach the issue of
prejudice, it should affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should adopt the
rule that an accused need not have actual knowledge of potential
collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for that plea
to be knowing and voluntary.

Similarly, this Court should hold

that defense counsel are under no constitutional duty to advise
defendant's about potential collateral consequences of pleading
guilty.

These are sound rules and will have the salutary effect

of giving litigants reliable guidance in the future.

On that

basis, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea should be upheld, and defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^^day of June, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

:

„„,

TODD A.
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A
Trial Court's Findings and Order

MR. COPE:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. ESPARZA:

ANY FURTHER ARGUMENT?

WE WOULD SUBMIT IT , JUDGE.

THE COURT: MR. COPE.
MR. COPE:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: UNLIKE MOST OF THE MOTIONS TO
WITHDRAW THAT A JUDGE OF THIS COURT NEEDS TO ADDRESS,
THIS ONE INVOLVES THE CREDIBILITY AND DEMEANOR OF A
WITNESS, I.E., MR. MCFADDEN.
NORMALLY WHEN THIS IS ADDRESSED, IT'S JUST ON
THE BASIS OF A COLD HARD TRANSCRIPT, AND WHAT WE TRY TO
DO IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY
QUESTIONS WERE ASKED AND THE NECESSARY ANSWERS WERE
RECEIVED.
BUT AS I INDICATED, THIS IS A LITTLE BIT
DIFFERENT, BECAUSE WHAT MR. MCFADDEN HAS NOW TOLD ME IS
THAT THE THINGS THAT HE TOLD ME UNDER OATH ON THE 25TH OF
APRIL, ARE NOT TRUE. AND I NECESSARILY THEN HAVE TO
CONSIDER HIS CREDIBILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS
TELLING ME THE TRUTH THEN, OR WHETHER HE'S TELLING ME THE
TRUTH TODAY.
I NECESSARILY HAVE TO PUT THIS IN THE CONTEXT
OF WHAT HAPPENED ON THE 25TH OF APRIL, 1991. AND THAT
IS, THAT MR. MCFADDEN WAS MOST OF THE WAY THROUGH A TRIAL
IN WHICH HE WAS FACING A CONVICTION ON A MINIMUM

45

00

1

MANDATORY FOR WHICH HE COULD BE SENT TO PRISON FOR A TERM

2

OF FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN YEARS WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT

3

WOULD BE FOR LIFE.

4

FURTHERMORE, AS MR. MCFADDEN WAS SITTING HERE,

5

HE OBVIOUSLY WAS LOOKING INTO THE EYES OF THE SAME JURORS

6

THAT I WAS LOOKING INTO, EIGHT WOMEN AND ONE MAN.

7

MCFADDEN PERHAPS SAW SOMETHING THAT I WASN'T LOOKING FOR,

8

BUT SAW IN THE EYES OF THOSE JURORS THE GREAT POTENTIAL

9

HE HAD FOR CONVICTION, ALL OF WHICH HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO

10
11

MR.

HIM ANYWAY.
IT'S IN THAT CONTEXT, I THINK, THAT I NEED TO

12

ANALYSE ANY CLAIMS SEEKING TO RID HIMSELF OF THOSE

13

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA.

14

ANALYSE THE BASIS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA UNDER

15

STANDARDS WHICH REQUIRE ME TO LOOK AT THE DEMEANOR AND

16

CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS,

17

AND AS I INDICATED, I MUST

I.E., MR. MCFADDEN.

AND HE TELLS ME TODAY THAT HE LIED TO ME ONCE.

18

ON ONE SETTING, BUT FOR MULTIPLE TIMES.

19

EVIDENTLY GAVE ME THERE WAS JUST WRONG, AND WAS A LIE.

20

EVEN THOUGH IT WAS UNDER OATH.

21

EVERY ANSWER HE

NOW HE ASKS ME BELIEVE HIS STATEMENTS TODAY

22

WHICH ARE UNDER OATH.

HE TELLS ME TODAY THAT ONE REASON

23

WHY HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA IS BECAUSE HE DIDN'T

24

UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES TO HIS BUSINESS.

25

HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND, AS HE TOLD ME FROM THE WITNESS

NOW, WHAT

ooisc
46

1

STAIR CHAIR TODAY, IS THAT HE WOULD SUFFER FINANCIAL

2

REVERSALS AS A RESULT OF ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY.

3

WELL, I INDICATED TO HIM ON THE RECORD THAT HE

4

COULD BE REQUIRED TO SERVE A SENTENCE OF ONE TO FIFTEEN

5

YEARS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY.

6

THE PLEA.

7

THAT'S WHAT OCCURS, THEN HE'S GOING TO BE LOCKED UP AND

8

HE'S NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND TO HIS BUSINESS?

9

WHICH WAS WHEN I TOOK

DOES THAT MEAN THAT I MUST TELL HIM THAT IF

EVIDENTLY, MR. MCFADDEN THINKS I ALSO NEED TO

10

EXPLAIN TO TO HIM WHAT IS SO OBVIOUS THAT IT NEEDS NO

11

EXPLANATION.

12

FURTHERMORE, IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT'S TO BE

13

RECITED UNDER RULE 11, NOR ANYTHING THAT RISES TO A

14

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT THAT BOYKEN WOULD REQUIRE ME TO MAKE

15

INQUIRY OF HIM ON THE RECORD ABOUT THAT TYPE OF MATTER.

16 I

HE ALSO TELLS ME TODAY UNDER OATH THAT HE

17

DIDN'T KNOW THAT IF HE WERE A CONVICTED FEON THAT HE

18

COULD NOT GET HIS LICENSE.

YET HE JUST NOW TOLD ME UNDER

19 I OATH THAT TWO YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS IN THE OFFICE OF THE
20

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS, OR DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, THAT

21

THAT THIS ONE PARTICULAR LADY TOLD HIM ABOUT THE

22

CONSEQUENCES.

23 I

IT COULD WELL HAVE BEEN THAT HE TUMBLED INTO

24

GIVING ME THOSE ANSWERS, BUT THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS

25

WHEN PEOPLE HAVE TO ANSWER NUMEROUS QUESTIONS BEING
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1
2 I

THROWN AT THEM, SUCH AS MR. MCFADDEN DID TODAY.
IT IS VERY, VERY, VERY CLEAR FROM THE EVIDENCE

3

BEFORE ME TODAY THAT MR. MCFADDEN KNEW THERE THERE WERE

4

CONSEQUENCES IN THE BUSINESS LICENSING, WITH THE

5

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, IF ONE WAS A CONVICTED FELON.

6

FURTHERMORE, I MIGHT INDICATE THAT MY

7

DISCUSSION OF THAT ASSUMES, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE BEING

8

BEFORE ME, THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOMEONE TO GET A

9

LICENSE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE IF THEY ARE A

10

CONVICTED FELON.

11

THAT IS NOT AN ASSUMPTION I'LL WILLING TO MAKE,

12

BUT THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR HAS ASSUMED THAT IS FACT, AND

13

MR. MC FADDEN HAS INDICATED HIMSELF THAT THAT'S NOT

14

NECESSARILY SO, BECAUSE YOU CAN BE A CONVICTED FELON, AND

15

HE WAS, AND STILL HAVE A LICENSE, BECAUSE THERE IS A

16

WAIVER PROCEDURE.

17

ALL OF WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD.

HE NOW TELLS ME THAT ANOTHER REASON IS THAT HE

18

DID NOT KNOW HE WOULD HAVE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER,

19

ON THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY.

20

TODAY ON THE WITNESS STAND THAT THE REASON WHY THAT'S A

21

PROBLEM IS BECAUSE OF HIS JOB AS A SALESPERSON.

22 I

AND HE SPECIFIC TOLD ME

WELL, THE STATUTE ON THIS INDICATES THAT THE

23

REGISTRY IS CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL PERSONS EXCEPT FOR LAW

24

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE STATE

OFFICE OF EDUCATION, AND

25

THE DEPARTMENT

SO THERE ISN'T ANY

OF CORRECTIONS.
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1

INDICATION, THEREFORE, OF ANY NEXUS BETWEEN THE THINGS

2

THAT HE'S WORRIED ABOUT, HIS BUSINESS, AND THE SEXUAL

3

OFFENDER REGISTRY.

4

NOW, I HAVE GONE THROUGH ALL THE REASONS WHY

5

HE, TODAY, TELLS ME HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF

6

GUILTY.

7

~

8

UNITED STATES UPON HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON.

EXCEPT FOR THIS ONE ABOUT THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF

ALLEGED POTENTIAL LOSS OF HIS RIGHT TO BE IN THE

9

AND I MUST CONSIDER THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF

10

EVERYTHING HE'S TOLD ME SO FAR TODAY, ALL OF WHICH SO

11

SERIOUSLY CHALLENGES HIS CREDIBILITY THAT, FRANKLY, THERE

12

IS NOT A LOT THAT MR. MCFADDEN COULD SAY THAT IS NOT

13

SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE ON THE BASIS OF HIS

14

CREDIBILITY.

15 I

HE TELLS ME THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED A

16 I PLEA TO OF GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN THIS THIS COULD AFFECT HIS
17

STATUS AS A RESIDENT ALIEN.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT

18

TESTIMONY.

19

FOR ME TO DENY THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON THOSE GROUNDS.

20

EACH OF THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAS GIVEN ARE NOT

AND FOR THAT REASON ALONE IT IS SUFFICIENT

21

RECITED IN RULE ELEVEN, WHICH GOES BEYOND THE

22

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

23

CITED GIVE RISE TO THE LEVEL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS THAT

24

MUST BE DISCLOSED TO A DEFENDANT WHEN TAKING A PLEA.

25

NONE OF THE REASONS HE HAS

FOR ALL THE REASONS I HAVE INDICATED HERE
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1

TODAY, THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA IS DENIED.

2

NOW, I CAN'T REMEMBER WHAT THE CASE LAW IS LIKE

3

ON THIS, BUT DOES THIS REQUIRE FINDINGS OF FACT,

4

CONCLUSION OF LAW, OR A DECREE?

5

MY RECITATION OF THE REASONS FOR MY RULING IS SUFFICIENT,

6

MR. COPE?

7
8

MR. COPE:

THE STATE'S POSITION IS THAT THE

RECORD THAT'S BEEN MADE BY YOUR REPORTER IS SUFFICIENT.

9
10

OR DO YOU BELIEVE THAT

THE COURT:

I MIGHT ADD THAT THERE IS REALLY NO

SUFFICIENT BASIS ON THE RECORD, FACTUAL BASIS, TO SHOW TO

11 I ME THERE THERE IS ANY RISK WHATSOEVER TO THE DEFENDANT
12

THAT HE WOULD LOSE HIS RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO RESIDE

13

SOMEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

14

I MEAN, WE HAVE AN UNNAMED, UNDEFINED AGENT

15

COMING OUT

TO THE PRISON; NO PETITIONS, NO LETTERS,

16

NOTHING LIKE THAT.

17

ANYTHING ELSE?

IF NOT, WE ARE IN RECESS.

18 I

(COURT IN RECESS NOW AT 4:12 P. M.)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

)

SEAN P. MCFADDEN,

}

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER
Case No. 911900245FS
Hon. Michael R. Murphy

Defendant.

'

Sean P. McFadden was placed under oath and entered a plea of
guilty to a single count of Forcible Sexual Abuse on 30 April
1991, five days after his trial on that charge began.

On 20 May

1991, he was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison after the court denied his motions to substitute counsel
and withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant then successfully appealed the district court's
denial of his motion to substitute counsel.

On 28 February 1992,

James Esparza entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant.
Twenty-one days later, the defendant claimed the privilege of
representing himself as co-counsel with Mr. Esparza.

On 15 May

1992, the defendant filed a memorandum outlining the grounds for
his "Motion to Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea".

On that same
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day, the court heard testimony from Mr. McFadden and argument
from both the State and the defendant regarding the motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Briefly

stated, Mr. McFadden urged

the court

grant his

motion because:
1.

When he entered the guilty plea, his defense counsel,

Lynn Brown, forced him to answer the court's questions in a
manner not consistent with the truth.
2.

Brown had not told him of the consequences

conviction might have upon his immigration

that a

status, insurance

agent's license and sex offender registry requirements.
3.

If Brown had correctly advised him about the above-

described matters, he would never have plead guilty, but would
have insisted that his trial go forward to its conclusion.
FACTS
There is no evidence that Mr. McFadden will ever be deported
from

the

United

States.

While

it

is

clear

that

he

is

"deportable" according to federal statute, the record shows that
absolutely no action has been taken against his resident alien
status.

On the contrary, he retains the ability to apply for

citizenship at any time.

He has been a resident in the United

States since the age of two and has a parent and several children
who are United States citizens.
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There
registered

is no
as

a

evidence
sex

that Mr, McFadden

offender

pursuant

to

has

77-27-21.5 (1) (c).

McFadden denied that he had ever been registered.
30

April

1991,

contemplating

a

no
plea

statutory
of

requirement

guilty

to

a

There was, on

that

sexual

specifically advised about this particular statute.
evidence that Mr. McFadden has or will

ever been

a

person

offense

be

There is no

suffer any civil or

criminal disability if he complies with this statute.
The defendant was aware, on 30 April 1991, that a felony
conviction would seriously jeopardize his chances of regaining a
license to sell or broker insurance in the state of Utah.

The

defendant testified to prior dealings with the state licensing
agency personnel who made him aware of this.
The defendant did not reveal the grounds for his Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea until he discussed them with James Esparza
in approximately March 1992.
During examination by the court and cross-examination by the
State, the defendant was evasive, self-serving and inconsistent
with earlier statements to the court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that
McFaddenfs testimony is untrustworthy and incredible.

It bears

insufficient indicia of reliability for the court to base any
factual findings upon it.

There is no credible evidence that
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McFadden's
McFadden

attorney

of

the

had

sex

a duty on

offender

30 April

registry,

the

1991

to

renewal

inform
of

insurance license, or the possibility of his deportation.

his
The

defendant had just listened to all, or virtually all, of the
State's evidence

in a trial which may have resulted

in his

conviction of a first degree felony with a minimum mandatory
sentence of 5, 10, or 15 years to life.

The defendant entered

his plea after a full and free discussion with the court about
its meaning, his state of mind, and his understanding.

He said

he understood, that his decision was voluntary and that he wanted
to plead guilty.

He now says that he lied to the court, that he

didn't understand, and that he was misled.

There is no reason to

suppose that his latest version is anything but a case of acute
buyer's remorse conjured up from prison.

There is no legal

reason to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea be and the same hereby is DENIED this
January, 1993.

day of

^^

DATED this -ZTst day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

j/Uu+J. (I, fL
MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Judge
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Approved as to form:

< A

&A

EARL XAIZ
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby
foregoing

certify

Findings

that

a true

Of

Fact,

and

correct

Conclusions

copy of the
Of

Law

And Order was delivered to Earl Xaiz, Attorney for Defendant SEAN
P. MCFADDEN at 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84111 on the ZlfiH^day of January, 1993.

FILEO MSTIUCT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 6 1993
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By ^ V " > ^ ^ri . V * 1
Deputy Ctorfc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH

SUMMARY DECISION AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 911900245

Plaintiff#
vs.
SEAN McFADDEN,
Defendant.

This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to
Reconsider Withdrawal of Guilty Plea.

That motion is denied for

the reasons specified below.
This court adopts the holdings of those cases which do not
require

defense

counsel

to

inform

a defendant

of

potential

deportation consequences flowing from a guilty plea. The facts of
this case support the proposition that counsel cannot be expected
to explain every possible consequence of a guilty plea. Defendant
in this case has gone so far in his testimony to suggest that his
defense counsel should have explained that a guilty plea might
jeopardize his business

license

issued

by the Department of

Insurance. Furthermore, the affidavit of Hakeem Ishola, submitted
by defendant himself, indicates only that defendant's status makes
him "deportable".

There is no evidence defendant will in fact be

deported.
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STATE V. McFADDEN

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

Defendant must not only present evidence of his counsel's
substandard performance, he must also demonstrate that, but for his
counsel's failure, he would never have pled guilty. Defendant has
presented no credible evidence that had he been informed of the
possibility of deportation he would not have entered a plea of
guilty.

Furthermore, defendant's demeanor and statements at the

time his plea was tendered and accepted indicated to this court
that his sole motive was to avoid what he perceived was a likely
jury verdict of guilt. As a consequence, disclosure of a possible
deportation would not have changed defendant's decision to plead
guilty.
Dated this /b

day of November, 19,93;.

d(Mj}
MICHAEL Ri, MURPHY ..
DISTRICT COURT J.UDGE'

0?
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SUMMARY DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Summary Decision and Order, to the following, this /if
day of November, 1993:

James M. Cope
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Earl Xaiz
Attorney for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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